"The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies"
Table of contents



  1. Chapter I Outline of the Operation 1
    1. The Southern Operation Plan 4
    2. Characteristics of the Dutch East Indies Operation 6
    3. Scheduling Issues, the Defining Feature of the Execution of the Operation 7


  2. Chapter II Situation of the Dutch East Indies 10
    1. Topography 10
    2. The Dutch East Indies Military Preparations 13


  3. Chapter III Operational Preparations Prior to the War 16
    1. Situation Until Summer 1941 16
    2. Preparations in the Summer and Fall of 1941 21
      1. Start of Full-scale Research; Conception of a Three-division Plan for the Dutch East Indies 21
      2. [The Situation] After the Decision on the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy of Early September 24
      3. The Situation in October 29
    3. Completion of Plans and Issue of Orders by Imperial General Headquarters 36
      1. Completion of Plans on 1 November and Shipping Plan 36
      2. Decision on the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy, and Orders Issued by Imperial General Headquarters 40
      3. Assessment of the Current Position of the Enemy and the Prospects for the Campaign 40
      4. Operation Plan of the Army 42
      5. Operation Plan of the Navy 49
      6. The Order Issued by the Army Department of Imperial General Headquarters to Prepare for Attack, the Instructions Given by the Chief of Army General Staff, and the [Army-Navy] Central Agreement 51
      7. The Order Issued by the Navy Department of Imperial General Headquarters to Prepare for Attack, the Instructions Given by the Chief of the Navy General Staff 55
      8. Orders for Invasion and Deployment 55
    4. The Southern Army's Plan and Orders 56
      1. The Combined Fleet´s Plan and Orders 58
      2. The Agreements Between the Southern Army, the Combined Fleet, and the Southern Task Force 59
      3. The Order Issued by the Southern Army to Prepare for Attack, and Its Operation Plan 62
      4. The [Navy] Southern Task Force´s Plan and Orders 66
      5. The Southern Army´s Invasion Order 67
    5. Operational Preparations of the Sixteenth Army 69
      1. Order of Battle [of the Sixteenth Army] 71
      2. Lineup of the Sixteenth Army Headquarters 73
      3. Formation and Personnel of the Divisions and the Infantry Group 73
      4. Iwakuni Agreement 76
      5. [Lieutenant General Imamura] Takes Command of the Sakaguchi Detachment and Sends It Off 91
      6. The [Navy] Philippines (Dutch East Indies) Unit Operation Order No. 1 92
      7. Operation Plan of the Sixteenth Army 93
      8. Taking Command of the 2d Division and Encouraging the Sakaguchi Detachment 101
      9. Preparation of a Propaganda Group 101
      10. Preparations for the Military Administration 102


  4. Chapter IV Opening of Hostilities and Capture of the Forward Advance Bases Davao and Jolo 103
    1. Capture of Davao 103
      1. The Arrangements Between the Army and Navy as Presented [to the Sakaguchi Detachment] 103
      2. Postponement of the Date for Capturing Davao 104
      3. Opening of Hostilities and Advance of the Date to Capture Davao 105
      4. The Plan to Capture Davao 106
      5. Departure, Landing and Occupation 108
    2. Capture of Jolo Island 110


  5. Chapter V Decision to Advance [the Schedule of] the Java Operation and the Sixteenth Army 115
    1. Decision to Advance [the Date of the Operation] 115
    2. The Cam Ranh Agreement and Shipping Issues 129
      1. Contents of the Agreement 129
      2. Confusion Caused by Bringing Forward the Java Operation 132
      3. Distinctive Features of the Cam Ranh Agreement 134
      4. Shipping Routes and Ships 135
    3. The Orders from [the Army Department of] Imperial General Headquarters 138
    4. The Southern Army´s Operational Direction 141
      1. The Orders to Prepare for the Capture of Java and the Aviation Plan 141
      2. Shipping Operations 146
      3. Transfer of the 38th and the 48th Division [to the Sixteenth Army] 152
      4. The Transfer of Other Units 153
      5. The Order for Capturing Java 154
    5. The [Navy] Southern Task Force´s Shift to Phase-Two Operations 155
      1. The Shift to Phase-Two Operations 155
      2. The Dutch East Indies Unit´s Phase-Two Mission 157
    6. Departure of the Headquarters of the Sixteenth Army and Revision of Its Operation Plan 160
      1. Issue of the Order to Assemble and Departure of the Headquarters of the Army 160
      2. Makeshift Measures for the 38th Division 161
      3. Reception of the Order to Prepare for the Capture of Java and Making Arrangements with the Navy 162
      4. The Southern Army´s Dissatisfaction and the Escort Issue 163
      5. Sending off the Eastern Detachment 164
      6. Revision of the Operation Plan 165


  6. Chapter VI The Launch of the Dutch East Indies Operation 168
    1. The Policy of the [Japanese] Government Towards the Netherlands 168
    2. The Launch of the Dutch East Indies Operation 169
    3. he Capture of Tarakan 173
      1. Change in the Landing Plan 173
      2. Arrangements with the Navy 173
      3. The Plan and Order for Capture 174
      4. Advance, Landing, and Capture 176
    4. The Capture of Menado 182


  7. Chapter VII The Capture of Java´s Dehors 185
    1. [Commander Imamura´s] Orders to the 38th Division 185
      1. The Sixteenth Army´s Arrangements with the [Navy] Malaya Unit 185
      2. Army Commander [Imamura] Heads for Gaoxiong After Giving Orders to the 38th Division 188
    2. The Manila Conference and the Arrangements Between the Sixteenth Army and the [Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit 190
      1. An Unexpected Request from the [Navy] Southern Task Force 190
      2. The General Situation Until Then 191
      3. The Effect on the Malaya Unit and the Order of the Southern Army 203
      4. The Situation in the Eastern Part of the Dutch East Indies 206
      5. The Manila Conference 209
      6. The Banjarmasin Issue 214
      7. The Plan of the Sixteenth Army and the Dutch East Indies Unit, and the Arrangement Between Them 222
      8. The Navy´s Shift to Phase-Three Operations and the Decision to Bring in the Carrier Task Force 233
    3. [Army Commander Imamura´s] Orders to the 48th Division, the Sakaguchi Detachment and the Main Force of the Army 235
      1. [Army Commander Imamura´s] Orders to the 48th Division 236
      2. The Arrangements of the 48th Division with the 4th Destroyer Squadron 237
      3. [Army Commander Imamura´s] Order to the Sakaguchi Detachment to Seize Banjarmasin 240
      4. The Arrangements of the Main Force of the Army with the 5th Destroyer Squadron 241
      5. [Army Commander Imamura´s] Orders to the 2d Division and the Shõji Detachment 244
      6. The Army´s Plan and Conduct of the Operation 246
      7. The Situation of the 2d Division 247
      8. Confusion at the Port of Gaoxiong 248
      9. The Army Commander Changes his Departure Date from Gaoxiong 251
    4. The Southern Sumatra Invasion Operation 252
      1. The Issue of a Second Postponement of Operation L Arises 252
      2. Preparations for the Southern Sumatra Invasion Operation 254
        1. Start of the Southern Sumatra Operation of the Third Air Force 254
        2. The Situation in Late January 255
        3. Reconsideration of the Employment of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group 257
        4. The Third Air Force Draws up the Outline of the Air Operations [for Operation] L 259
        5. Implementation of the Endau Landing Operation and the Occupation of the Anambas Islands 263
        6. The Army-Navy Arrangement on the Air Operations [in Operation] L 264
        7. The 38th Division´s Operation Plan 267
        8. The [Southern Army´s] Decision to Employ the [Paratroop] Raiding Group Mainly for [the Seizure of] the [Palembang] Airfield; the 38th Division´s Arrangements with the [Navy] Malaya Unit 272
        9. The [Navy] Malaya Unit´s Orders; the Arrangements Made Between the 38th Division and the Navy Escort Force/Navy River-ascending Unit 278
        10. The 38th Division´s Order 282
        11. The Operational Preparations of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group 285
      3. Postponement of [Operation] L and H 292
        1. Second Postponement of [Operation] L (Two Days) 292
        2. The Situation at Ledo Until Then 294
        3. Third Postponement of [Operation] L (Four Days) 300
      4. Air Operations and the Sailing of the Convoys 308
        1. The Air Campaign of the 3d Air Division to Destroy the Enemy 308
        2. The Air Operations of the [Navy] Malaya Unit 309
        3. The Judgment on the Enemy Movements, the Sailing of the Convoy and the Fleet, and a Naval Engagement 311
      5. The Paratroop Drop 316
        1. [Paratroop] Raiding Group Order 316
        2. The Collaboration of the Different Air Units 321
        3. Takeoff, Drop and Occupation 324
        4. The Situation from the 15th Onwards 331
      6. The 38th Division´s Invasion of Southern Sumatra 333
        1. The Capture of Mentok 334
        2. The Landing at Palembang 335
        3. The Capture of Tanjungkarang 337
        4. Delay in the Upriver Ascent of the Convoy of the Main Force 341
        5. The Capture of Bengkulu 341
        6. Occupation of the Jambi Oil Fields and Gelumbang 343
        7. Oil and the [Paratroop] Raiding Group 344
    5. The Capture of Balikpapan and Kendari 346
      1. The Capture of Balikpapan 348
        1. The Scheme to Occupy [Balikpapan] Intact and the Plan for a Surprise Attack 348
        2. The Operation Plan of the Sakaguchi Detachment 351
        3. Dispatch of the Messengers and Guides 354
        4. The Sailing of the Convoy and the Surprise Attacks on the Anchorage 356
        5. Occupation of the Balikpapan Sector 358
      2. The Capture of Kendari 361
    6. The Capture of Ambon 361
      1. Changes in the Plan to Capture Ambon 361
      2. [The Ambon Operation] in Relation to the Navy´s Shift to Phase-Three Operations 362
      3. Departure of the Eastern Detachment from Hong Kong and Its Arrival in Davao 363
      4. Operation Plan 365
      5. Sailing, Landing and Capture 368
    7. The Capture of Banjarmasin, Makassar, Bali and Timor 373
    8. Politico-Strategic Issues and Phase-Three Operations of the Navy 373
      1. The Strategic Background and the Major Strategic and Tactical Issues 373
      2. The Issue of Seizing Dili 380
      3. Phase-Three Operations of the Naval Units 386
    9. The Seizure of Banjarmasin 391
      1. Preparations for the Seizure 391
      2. The Seizure 393
    10. The Seizure of Makassar 394
    11. The Capture of Bali 397
    12. The Capture of Timor 403
      1. Preparations for the Operation 403
      2. The Carrier Task Force‘s Air Strike on Port Darwin 407
      3. The Seizure of Kupang 408
      4. The Seizure of Dili 412


  8. Chapter VIII The Invasion of Java 417
    1. Progress of the Preparations for the Invasion of Java 417
      1. The General Situation Until Mid-February 418
      2. The Advance of the Assembly Points 428
      3. The Decision to Include the Sakaguchi Detachment, the Change in the Operation Plan of the [Sixteenth] Army, and the Paradrop [Operation] Issue 430
    2. The Sailing [of the Convoys] 435
      1. The Situation of the Enemy as Assessed Just Before the Sailing 435
      2. The Start of the Sailing and a Two-Day Postponement of the Landings 437
      3. Another One-Day Postponement of the Date of Landing and Naval Engagements 452
      4. Entry into the Anchorage, Start of the Landings and Naval Engagements 456
    3. Operations of the Main Force of the [Sixteenth] Army 459
      1. The Operation Plans 459
        1. The Operation Plan of the [Sixteenth] Army 459
        2. The Operation Plan of the Shõji Detachment 462
        3. The Operation Plan of the 2d Division 465
        4. The Operation Plan of the Third Air Force 467
      2. The Operations in the Sector of the 2d Division; the Operational Direction by the [Sixteenth] Army 470
        1. Landing; the Ship with the [Sixteenth] Army Headquarters Torpedoed 470
        2. Shifting Priority to the Buitenzorg Road 483
        3. The Worries of the [Sixteenth] Army Headquarters 486
        4. The Battle of Leuwiliang 490
        5. A Favorable Turn Followed by Setbacks 495
        6. A Further Setback 502
        7. Report of an Offer of Surrender by the Bandung Garrison 503
      3. The Operations of the Shõji Detachment 505
        1. The Seizure of the Kalijati Airfield on Day One of the Landing and the Enemy´s Assault on the Disembarkation Point 507
        2. The 2d [of March]: The Detachment Headquarters Overrun and the Advance of the Air Units [of the 3d Air Division] 509
        3. The 3d [of March]: [Enemy] Counterattacks at All Fronts 510
        4. The 4th [of March]: Disembarkation Completed 514
        5. Third Air Division Commander [Endõ] and Detachment Commander Shõji´s Change of Mind 515
        6. The Third Air Force´s Support of the Ground Operations 518
        7. The 5th [of March]: Heading for the Bandung Stronghold 522
        8. The 6th [of March]: Attack on the [Enemy´s] Main Position and Seizure of the Mountaintop 523
        9. The 7th [of March]: The Bandung Garrison Offers to Surrender 526
      4. The Surrender of the Dutch East Indies Army 529
        1. The Meeting with the Governor-General and His Party 529
        2. Broadcast of the Surrender and the Second Meeting 533
        3. Triumphal Entry into Bandung and Citations of Merit 535
      5. The Operations of the Sakaguchi Detachment 537
        1. Operation Plan 537
        2. Implementation of the Operation 540
      6. The Operations of the 48th Division 548
        1. Terrain and Operation Plan 548
        2. Operational Preparations 551
        3. Landing, and Seizure of Rembang and the Bridges over the Solo River 552
        4. Meeting Engagements at the Banks of the Brantas River 554
        5. The Seizure of Porong 561
        6. Preparations for Seizing the Surabaya Stronghold 562
        7. Surrender of the Eastern Corps of the Dutch East Indies Army 564
      7. Conclusion of the Java Invasion Operation and the Operations of the Allied Forces 567
        1. The Troop Strength [Involved in] the Operation and the Military Gains 567
        2. The Operations of the Allied Forces 570
        3. The Black Clandestine Broadcasts by the Southern Army 574
        4. The Shift to the Military Administration 585